The “other” in image and perception

The deepening rift between Jews and Arabs in Israel is of particular concern to researchers. A recent study (^{Israeli, 2020}) found that 42% of Jews in the country were ambivalent toward Arab citizens’ needs and believed that they should be treated with both respect and suspicion. The sense of suspicion was higher among religious conservatives and those on the political right. The status of Arabs in Israel is among the most divisive issues for the country’s Jewish majority, with differences evident along political and religious lines (^{Abu-Asba, 2020}). In the Israeli study (2020), three-quarters of respondents on the political left perceived Arabs as equal citizens, compared to 42% of centrists and secularists and 18% of religious conservatives and ultra-Orthodox. Respectively, about a third of the right and the religious (about 30%) and the ultra-Orthodox (45%) said they perceived Arabs as enemies. This was compared to 16% of centrists and secularists, and just 2% of those on the political left.

In this sense, ^{Eagly and Koenig (2021}) asserts that stereotypes have been recognized as important cognitive means for organizing and processing information on the world surrounding us. They also have a prominent social character, they are -usually, but not necessarily- collective perceptions, social and cultural constructs formed, inherited, and maintained within a certain community.

The emergence of stereotypes, their content, preservation, or change can be influenced by various factors, both subjective (e.g., a value system within a community) and objective (external circumstances such as political, social, cultural, etc.). For national stereotypes, geographical proximity and contact are important factors contributing to forming attitudes and stereotypical notions (^{Törnquist-Plewa, 2000}).

An uneasy coexistence

Early experiments on abstract groups by and subsequent work in social settings (Haslam & Turner, 1992) highlight two effects. First, individuals stereotype groups by exaggerating differences with the outgroup (intergroup contrast) while dampening within group differences (overestimation of intragroup homogeneity). This is a process of social categorization based on Social Identity Theory (^{Tajfel, 1981}), and describes how the perception of society is divided in “us versus them”.

In this sense, studies such as ^{Falah et al. (2000}) and ^{Hisherik and Paul-Binyamin (2024}) find that certain social realities and political opinions have significant effects on perceptions between Arabs and Jews that promote the acquisition or maintenance of prejudices, promoting a process of social categorization that hinders coexistence. The historical context and hostile political environment in which the state of Israel was created in 1948 and the series of hostilities that followed, as well as institutional practices perceived as discriminatory, have favoured the formation of prejudice between Arabs and Jews. Among such factors, they suggest that discrimination in the provision of municipal services and home ownership, neighbourhood conditions, extreme political opinions, identification with symbols, or not knowing the language propitiate social categorization and the formation of prejudice. However, there are other factors that have a positive impact on perceptions of the other, such as Arabs and Jews living in the same flats, as well as the willingness to integrate with each other.

Second, when an individual identifies with a group, he/she may tend to “depersonalizes”, slanting his beliefs toward the perceived group view, namely the stereotype. This group process produces a psychological state in individuals in which there is a decrease in self-evaluation (personal awareness or identity) and fear of being evaluated by others, which favours anti-normative behaviour and a decrease in prosocial behaviour (^{Berger & Andaur, 2022}), producing a transition from individual identity to collective identity, accepting and internalising the specific norms, beliefs, and values of the group. This process of social categorization and the subsequent stereotypes derived from it have a negative effect on the coexistence of both ethnic groups (Jews and Arabs). Thus, the historical-political context, situational and personal factors, or the political and social practices discussed above, have a significant impact on the population’s transition from individual to group identity. ^{Falah et al. (2000}) report that one of the most influential factors is extreme political opinions.

Additionally, there is diversity in ethnicity, language, religion, customs, traditions, and culture, as mentioned above, although human beings have differences in national beliefs, religions, languages, and cultures caused by ethnic diversity, everyone needs to coexist. Considering only the differences between them can lead to conflicts that do not benefit either party. Acceptance of cultural diversity and the uniqueness of each culture (cultural integration) or multicultural (cultural pluralism) means that the society accepts cultural differences and tries not to dominate each other. In this regard, according to some authors, to promote particularistic education that enhances the unique cultural characteristics of specific cultural groups and the preservation of their identity, and pluralistic education that cultivates intercultural tolerance and respect and promotes dialogue between groups, encourages positive coexistence and equality, which reduces potential social conflicts (see ^{Ḥaj Yaḥya, 2021}; ^{Nahhas, 2020}). To this end, teachers are considered as key agents of social change responsible for educating future citizens. In addition to providing knowledge, this sector of the population is relevant in addressing issues related to social equality, the promotion of multiculturalism, tolerance, and a shared society (^{Hisherik & Paul-Binyamin, 2024}). Therefore, teachers are key to disseminating these kinds of values and knowledge to students and thus to the future citizens who could transform society. However, the social and political context in which teachers are immersed is not innocuous for them, as they are the product of the society in which they live and of their own educational system. Therefore, it is relevant to know the perceptions of teachers as part of the population of Jewish and Arab ethnic groups and as potential agents of social change. The multicultural context of Israel, where Jews and Arabs study, adds to the importance of this issue.

Israeli Arabs relations with the state and the Jewish majority are dynamic and influenced by national policies that affect their welfare, economic situation, civil rights, and degree of integration into society. Over the years, the living standard for Arab citizens of Israel has increased, and progress has been made in education and employment -although most Arabs in Israel (65%) still work in low-paying physical trades such as construction, agriculture, and unskilled professions (^{Abu-Asba, 2020}).

But coexistence requires more than money, work, and access to education. ^{Samooha (2012}) defines coexistence between Jews and Arabs in Israel as a voluntary recognition of equal rights and a shared loyalty to the state. Moreover, to ^{Samooha (2012}), peaceful coexistence requires that Jews and Arabs accept the right of the other to a state without conditions, adhere to democratic procedures (non-violence), and accept fiduciary duties to the state, among other measures.

When coexistence leads to conflict, it is largely due to shifting attitudes influenced by policy changes (^{Samooha, 2022a}). In other words, because the government is a major player in Arab-Jewish relations, its policies toward the Arab population and the Palestinians influence the attitudes of Arab and Jewish citizens toward each other, and toward the state.

According to the ^{Achord Institute’s Ideal Graduate Model (2021}), ensuring a sense of connection and belonging to the collective Israeli group, coupled with a deep sense of belonging to their own group, can provide the foundation for a meaningful Arab-Jewish partnership in Israeli society.

View of self, view of the other

Ethnic and religious conflict is a form of conflict supposedly generated on the basis of real or imagined “difference” rooted in ethnic and religious identities. It is “supposedly” because of the need to avoid the essentialism that characterizes discourses on identity politics, especially the independent power assigned to these identities in shaping political consciousness. Sometimes religious identity becomes part of an ethnic group’s identity or vice versa and presents a volatile social mixture coupled with the power of the ethnic group’s myth of common descent (^{Jah et al., 2023}).

As a socio-political concept, identity has both an individualistic and a collective meaning: it is a “process located in the core of the individual and yet in the core of his community culture, a process which established, in fact, the identity of these two identities. In other words, it can simply be defined as a person’s sense of belonging to a group if it influences his political behavior” (^{Werf et al., 2020}).

In identity, conflicts, especially ethnic and religious ones, are the hardest to settle because they are embedded in beliefs, tradition, and culture. It becomes worst when it drives political activities. Further, identity is a personified embodiment of characteristics of what some person or group represents and belongs to. The identity is laden with values, interest, and needs that direct the pursuit of these factors (^{Jah et al., 2023}).

For Arabs in Israel, identity is complicated by several factors. On the one hand, Arab Israelis have an emotional connection to an Arab nation that has failed to meet expectations, both domestic and foreign (some in Arab countries even consider Arabs in Israel to be traitors). On the other hand, to paraphrase ^{Samooha (2012}), Arab citizens of Israel have supported the state and feel loyal to it. Many Arabs even cooperated in political, intelligence, and security capabilities, contributing to the establishment of the Israeli government in Arab areas.

^{Rozner et al. (2022}) assert that, based on survey data, many Jews in Israel (about 70%) feel connected to other Jews, and most (64%) recognize a common future for “all Jews” in the country. A small majority feel a special closeness to “all Israelis,” and a larger majority believe there is a common future for “all Israelis” (58%). Respondents also emphasize that policies encouraging residential separation between Arabs and Jews are damaging to the country and reinforce stereotypes, as well as structural discrimination.

Arab Israelis, meanwhile, often view themselves more as Palestinians belonging to a greater Arab nation than as citizens of a Jewish-majority state. Many Arab Israelis also see themselves as members of the Muslim religious community. This multiplicity of parallel identities generates significant tensions and manifests in several ways. For instance, it fuels Jewish attitudes toward Arabs, which can range from reserved to hostile. It also makes it difficult for Arab Israelis to feel that Israel is their country (^{Rotem, 2019}).

^{Hermann (2017}) examined the identities of the Jewish majority and the Arab minority in Israel, focusing primarily on language, a key component of identity. In her research, she asked respondents whether they spoke the language of the “other,” that is, whether Jews spoke Arabic or Arabs spoke Hebrew. In majority-minority relations, those in minority typically have a greater need to be fluent in the language of the majority. In line with this linguistic understanding, Hermann found that the percentage of Arabs who speak Hebrew was much higher than the percentage of Jews who speak Arabic.

In December 2021, in a survey of Arab-Jewish relations, ^{Samooha (2022b}) found that most Arabs in Israel define themselves through a Palestinian lens: 36.3% defined themselves as Palestinians living in Israel and 30.3% said they were Palestinian, making no mention of their Israeli citizenship. Only 33.1% defined themselves as Israeli Arabs.

In the same survey, most Arab Israelis (68.3%) blamed Israel for the conflict between Palestinians and the Israeli state; they viewed Jewish rejection of the two-state solution as a primary driver of conflict.

Yet, even if Israel were to fulfill this requirement, the state itself will remain a Jewish and Zionist state under the control of a Jewish majority, which will in turn continue to conflict with Arab identity formation (^{Samooha, 2022b}). Thus, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is often referred to as a territorial conflict, but it is also a conflict over identity preservation (^{Ersoy-Ceylan, 2023}).

Based on this background, the aim of the study is to investigate Arab and Jewish perceptions of the other, identify commonalities, and coexistence perceptions in a sample of Arab and Jewish teachers.

Derived from this aim, the following research questions were formulated: (R1) Will Arab teachers be more likely than Jewish teachers to perceive their relationship with the other negatively?; (R2) Will Arab teachers perceive themselves as less Israeli than Jewish teachers?; and (R3) Given the historical and social context, will Arab teachers report a stronger desire for coexistence than Jewish teachers?

Method

In order to achieve the aforementioned goal, a quantitative study was designed with a descriptive, cross-sectional, and correlational design using a survey methodology.

Results

Since the sample distribution does not follow normality and homogeneity of variances parameters, non-parametric tests were performed to compare the groups.

To answer R1, a non-parametric U Mann Whitney test was conducted, which did not reveal significant differences between Arab teachers’-Arab citizens’ relationship perception (M = 159.9, n = 150) and Jews teachers’ school’s perception (M = 141.07, n = 150), U = 9836, W = 21161, Z = -1.9, p = .06).

For a deeper analysis, another Mann Whitney U test was conducted to identify differences in Arabs citizens-state relations components scores between Arab and Jews teachers. The result of this test is presented in Table 1. As can be learned from this table, significant differences were found between Arab and Jewish teachers in the index of relations between Jews and Arabs compared to the situation with the establishment of the state, in the relations between the Arab residents and the state, in social and political relations about the state, in the integration of Arab residents in decision-making in the country, in national and military service, the equal attitude of the state towards the Arab residents, in the democratization index towards the Arab residents, and in the index of denial of the right to vote and in the index of equal allocation of budgets. On the other hand, no differences were found between Arab and Jewish teachers in the index of the attitudes of the Arab residents towards Israel and in the index of decision-making at the level of the government’s policy on Jews only.

Another Mann Whitney U test for conducted to test R2. The results revealed that Jews teachers’ coexistence attitudes score was significantly higher (M = 190.06, n = 150) compared to the Arab teachers’ coexistence attitudes (M = 110.4, n = 150), U = 5231, W = 16556, Z = -8.1, p < .001 with a moderate effect size r = .66.

In the same way, it was carried out a Mann Whitney U test to check differences in coexistence attitudes components scores between Arab and Jews teachers. The results revealed significantly higher willingness of Jew teachers compared to Arab to meet with the other, study together, host him, be roommates, be friends, and share social media together. According to these findings, it can be argued that Jews teachers are characterized by a distinctly higher willingness than Arab teachers for coexistence (Table 2).

A Mann Whitney U test was conducted to examine R3 and revealed that Jews teachers’ identity perception score was significantly higher (M = 201.38, n = 150) compared to the Arab teachers’ identity perception (M = 99.62, n = 150), U = 3618, W = 14943, Z = -10.2, p < .001 with a strong effect size r = .83.

A second U Mann Whitney test conducted to test differences in identity component scores between Arab and Jewish teachers. The result of this U Mann Whitney test is presented in Table 3, and it indicates significant differences between Jewish and Arab teachers in terms of the sense of belonging to Israeli society, perception of the relationship between Jews and Arabs, preserving national identity, sense of Israeliness, and in terms of the hints and symbols of the state, with higher mean values for Jewish teachers. In the case of loyalty to the state on the part of Israeli Arabs who feel part of the Palestinian people, there are statistically significant differences, but it is the Arab teachers who obtain higher values.

Discussion

The main purpose of the study was to examine mutual perception, identity perception, and coexistence perception between Arab and Jewish teachers in Israel. The findings presented in this study may be relevant to understanding the relationships currently established between the Arab and Jewish populations in the current context of inequality and conflict in the state of Israel. The study therefore provides an approach and description of psychological, providing data that could be useful to carry out interventions at national and local level that favor equality and integration and reduce stereotypes.

In addressing R1, the findings did not reveal significant differences between Arab and Jewish teachers in terms of the total relation scores between them. However, Arab teachers believe that Arab residents of Israel are treated better than past generations, that Arab residents have a stronger connection to Israel than before, that Arab residents have strong social and political ties with the state, that the state should integrate Israeli Arabs into decision-making processes, and that the state of Israel should give equal budgets to Jewish and Arab communities. Jewish teachers, meanwhile, feel strongly that Israeli citizens, whether Arab or Jew, should do national or military service, that the state has treated Arab residents unfairly, that the government is democratic, and that the right to vote should be denied to those who oppose the Jewish nature of the state. Both groups had positive perceptions of Arab Israelis’ attitude toward the state, and both groups disagreed that only Jewish Israelis should be making national policy decisions. These findings are supported by past studies, such as ^{Rodin (2019}), which showed that Jews and Arabs hold negative perceptions of each other, but Jews perceive Arabs more negatively and less modern than themselves. In addition, it was also showed that Jews perceive Arabs as enemies who endanger Israel’s existence, while Arabs hold fewer extreme positions against Jews in Israel. Still, the trend of mutual negative perception is clearly observed. Such findings can be explained by the radicalization of both sides. Attacks on Israel from the West Bank and Gaza have crystalized a negative view of Arabs in general, including Israeli Arab citizens (^{Rodin, 2019}). Rodin’s study (2019) showed that Arabs believe that Jews do not accept them as citizens with equal rights and express high levels of lack of trust in Arab citizens. Also, Arabs believe that Jews hate them and try not to come make contacts or interactions with the Arab citizens. ^{Niwa et al. (2016}) also revealed that Jews also hold negative stereotypes against Arabs such that they believe that Arabs hate Jews and do not accept the Israel state existence as a Jewish state. Jews also believe that Arabs do not believe in Jews and express low levels of trust for them. The deterioration in relations was reflected, among other things, in bills of a restrictive nature, such as the preference of military former members of the armed forces in employment, admission of settlers to small localities in the periphery after an examination by an admissions committee, charging those seeking citizenship with a declaration of allegiance to a Jewish state, and the enactment of the Nationality Law (Israel - The nation state of the Jewish people) in July 2018.

In examining R2, we found perceptions of coexistence to be significantly higher for Jewish teachers than Arab teachers, suggesting a greater willingness from Jewish teachers to interact and coexist. These results are supported by several studies such as ^{Falah et al. (2000}), which report data indicating that a large part of the Jewish population accepts the fact that Arabs in Israel are a given reality to be accommodated. ^{Hisherik and Paul-Binyamin (2024}) argue that there are tentative advances towards inclusivity, with a willingness on the part of Jews to accept Arab citizenship and collaborate in various spheres. Examples include the integration of Arab teachers into Jewish schools and vice versa, along with efforts to bring Arabs into the job market and support freedom of expression. ^{Rozner et al. (2022}) asked Jewish and Arab respondents to define the phrases “common future” and “closeness” and found that most Jews and Arabs in Israel agree that most shared spaces, such as hospitals or supermarkets, should be shared by all citizens. ^{Rozner et al. (2022}) state that, according to survey data on the Jewish population, a majority believe that there is a common future for “all Israelis” (58%), however, participants cite residential separation policies as detrimental to coexistence.

In addressing R3, we found that Jewish teachers feel a stronger sense of belonging to Israeli society, believe that relations between Jews and Arabs are sufficient, and value cultural separation as a means to preserve national and personal identity. Respondents also expressed doubt that Israeli Arabs can be both Palestinian and loyal to Israel. In contrast, Arab teachers felt less Israeli, viewed Israel’s symbols as irrelevant, opposed the idea that national and personal identities were mutually exclusive, and believed that an Israeli Arab who identifies as Palestinian can also be a loyal citizen to Israel. These findings are also consistent with past studies examining perception of Arab national identity in Israel, such as ^{Rotem (2019}), which showed that Jewish citizens of Israel are not only citizens of the state but are also part of a larger group that is not contained within Israel’s territorial borders (the Jewish diaspora).

Arabs of Israel share their Israeli citizenship with a Jewish population but see themselves, to a greater or lesser degree, as part of the Palestinian people and the Arab nation (^{Rotem, 2019}) rather than of Israel. Many also see themselves as part of the Muslim religious community. This multiplicity of parallel identities generates great tension between Arabs and Jews in Israel, which ranges from reticence to hostility (^{Samooha, 2022a}).

In the 2018 Israeli Democracy Index, nearly half of all Arab Israeli respondents (49%) identified themselves as Arab rather than Palestinian (25%), Israeli (18%), or religious (8%) (Aryan, 2018). This finding can be explained by the discrimination and exclusion of Arab citizens in Israel, as they do not receive their collective rights and the state does not treat them as citizens with equal rights. Therefore, they emphasize their Palestinian identity and neglect their identity as Israeli Arab citizens.

Among Jews, secularism is strongly linked with an “Israeli” self-definition, although the two do not necessarily overlap. Those who define themselves as “traditional” are divided between Israeli and Jewish as their primary identities. In contrast to Arab Israelis, Jews view the state as “their” country and receive full rights and budgets. Thus, it stands to reason that they are more loyal to the state than Arab citizens.

Considering the findings on perception of the other, identity and coexistence, these could be positively promoted through the implementation of more egalitarian social policies (e.g., non-restrictive policies regarding access to certain jobs and places of residence based on nationality or segregation of educational contexts), the creation of cooperative relationship, and the establishment of common goals between Arabs and Jews. These strategies attend to and could be based on Social Contact Theory (^{Allport, 1954}), thus encouraging the use of common spaces and shared activities that promote experiences between members of different groups that are positive rather than hostile or unpleasant. Furthermore, as future lines of research, this information could be expanded by exploring more deeply other factors at the psychological and social level that could be protective factors that could be introduced into educational, political, and religious discourses or conflict, generating factors and bases, such as the influence of conditioning factors and schemes based on cognitive and socio-cultural practices and schemes of religious or political origin. In this way, more effective interventions could be designed and implemented. These interventions should be applied first to teachers as a whole, since as agents of social change and trainers of students who will be future citizens, they should have as positive perceptions as possible and believe in a possible coexistence and a fair multicultural society. Based on the findings of this study, interventions should aim to promote coexistence and identity with the Israeli state among Arab teachers.

Conclusions

The results revealed that there are no significant differences in the total perception of relations between Arab citizens and the state between Arab and Jewish teachers, the perception of identity is significantly lower for Arab teachers, and the perception of coexistence is significantly higher for Jewish teachers. This research provides data on psychological variables that help to understand the relationship between the Arab and Jewish populations in the current social context. It therefore establishes an approach and description of the psychological factors on the perception of the other, identity, and coexistence in these populations, which can be useful for carrying out effective interventions that favor equality and integration and reduce stereotypes. In this sense, it is important to know the current state of the question among teachers since, in addition to being a part of Israel’s population, they are important agents of social change in the training of future citizens and the promotion of a shared and egalitarian society.